1. What trends did you identify?

RPC and FTP services are popular amongst attackers.Numerous ftp and rpc scans were used to identify available services on the victim hosts.Scans for RPC services are often followed by RPC info queries.In the following snort log info, a host scans for systems with the RPC services running.This scan is followed by an RPC info query.Eighteen minutes later another host scans for RPC services and again the scan is followed by an RPC info query.Another host exploits the RPC service and compromises a system the next day (notice how a scan was not done prior to the exploit, indicating that this is probably a returning attacker from one of the previous scans the day before).The attack that this individual uses is quite common and was used several times against the same system as indicated in the snort logs.

 

Scan from the first host:

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: spp_portscan: PORTSCAN DETECTED from 61.129.65.42 (STEALTH)

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 61.129.65.42:111 -> 172.16.1.102:111

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 61.129.65.42:111 -> 172.16.1.103:111

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 61.129.65.42:111 -> 172.16.1.104:111

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 61.129.65.42:111 -> 172.16.1.105:111

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 61.129.65.42:111 -> 172.16.1.107:111

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 61.129.65.42:111 -> 172.16.1.108:111

Nov 6 16:44:14 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 61.129.65.42:111 -> 172.16.1.109:111

Nov 6 16:44:19 ids snort[237]: RPC Info Query: 61.129.65.42:777 -> 172.16.1.107:111

Nov 6 16:44:36 ids snort[237]: spp_portscan: portscan status from 61.129.65.42: 8 connections across 7 hosts: TCP(8), UDP(0) STEALTH

Nov 6 16:44:52 ids snort[237]: spp_portscan: End of portscan from 61.129.65.42: TOTAL time(4s) hosts(7) TCP(8) UDP(0) STEALTH

 

Scan from the second host:

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: spp_portscan: PORTSCAN DETECTED from 62.98.45.141 (STEALTH)

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.101:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.102:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.103:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.104:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.105:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.106:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.107:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.108:111

Nov 6 17:02:50 ids snort[237]: SCAN-SYN FIN: 62.98.45.141:111 -> 172.16.1.109:111

Nov 6 17:02:55 ids snort[237]: RPC Info Query: 62.98.45.141:816 -> 172.16.1.101:111

Nov 6 17:02:58 ids snort[237]: RPC Info Query: 62.98.45.141:826 -> 172.16.1.107:111

 

The attack begins here:

Nov 7 23:11:05 ids snort[1260]: RPC Info Query: 216.216.74.2:962 -> 172.16.1.101:111

Nov 7 23:11:06 ids snort[1260]: RPC Info Query: 216.216.74.2:963 -> 172.16.1.107:111

Nov 7 23:11:31 ids snort[1260]: spp_portscan: portscan status from 216.216.74.2: 2 connections across 1 hosts: TCP(2), UDP(0)

Nov 7 23:11:31 ids snort[1260]: IDS08 - TELNET - daemon-active: 172.16.1.101:23 -> 216.216.74.2:1209

Nov 7 23:11:34 ids snort[1260]: IDS08 - TELNET - daemon-active: 172.16.1.101:23 -> 216.216.74.2:1210

Nov 7 23:11:47 ids snort[1260]: spp_portscan: portscan status from 216.216.74.2: 2 connections across 2 hosts: TCP(2), UDP(0)

Nov 7 23:11:51 ids snort[1260]: IDS15 - RPC - portmap-request-status: 216.216.74.2:709 -> 172.16.1.107:111

Nov 7 23:11:51 ids snort[1260]: IDS362 - MISC - Shellcode X86 NOPS-UDP: 216.216.74.2:710 -> 172.16.1.107:871

Nov 7 23:12:03 ids snort[1260]: spp_portscan: portscan status from 216.216.74.2: 2 connections across 1 hosts: TCP(0), UDP(2)

Nov 7 23:12:23 ids snort[1260]: spp_portscan: portscan status from 216.216.74.2: 1 connections across 1 hosts: TCP(1), UDP(0)

†††††

A similar attack that took place prior shows how common this exploit is:

††††† Nov 4 22:29:45 ids snort[5240]: RPC Info Query: 24.69.66.75:738 -> 172.16.1.107:111

††††† Nov 4 22:30:41 ids snort[5240]: IDS15 - RPC - portmap-request-status: 24.69.66.75:851 -172.16.1.107:111

Nov 4 22:30:41 ids snort[5240]: IDS362 - MISC - Shellcode X86 NOPS-UDP: 24.69.66.75:852 -> 172.16.1.107:949†††

†††††

 

  1. What does this activity tell us about the blackhat community?

With the information in the previous log we can identify a few characteristics of the blackhat community.Attackers are continually looking for the same vulnerabilities to exploit and typically take the same approach in identifying these vulnerabilities.Also attackers are using similar exploits.This idea accompanied with their similar approach would indicate that they share an abundance of information and exploit code.

  1. What if anything happened in the firewall and IDS logs that gave us a clue of what was coming? Could any of the attacks been predicted ahead of time. If so, how?

The firewall and IDS logs continually indicated that attackers were searching for systems running services that are easily exploitable.Scans for FTP and RPC services along with multiple queries to the RPC service would indicate that these attackers are searching for vulnerable systems.After a quick search at your favorite security site, we would be able to make an educated guess as to what kinds of attacks were about to come.

  1. What data did you find more valuable, the Snort alerts or the firewall logs of unique scans? Why?

I made use mostly of the Snort logs for the simple fact that I could see the destination of these scans and attacks.It was also helpful to know what kinds of connection attempts were being made to the internal systems.

  1. What lesson did you learn from this?

Iíve found substantial information that reinforces my theories about script kiddies.First:They donít care who you are or what kind of business you run; they will take advantage of your system just because they can.Second:The community is large and shares a wealth of information (the alternative to being truly skilled).

  1. How long did this challenge take you?

I spent about one day analyzing the logs and about an hour completing the write up.

 

 

Bonus Question:
Both the Snort alerts and the inbound firewall logs missed a successful attack. The only reason the Honeynet Project detected this successful attack was because the compromised system attempted an outbound connection (by definition this means a system was compromised). The Honeynet Project did a write-up on this incident, can you identify the attack and why the Honeynet failed to alert to the attack (though the attack was captured). Hint: the attack is written up and posted somewhere on our site.