Scan 15

10/05/2001 21:30

Getting the data to analyse

Downloaded honeypot.tar.gz from

# md5sum honeynet.tar.gz 
0dff8fb9fe022ea80d8f1a4e4ae33e21  honeynet.tar.gz
# md5sum honeypot.hda8.dd 
5a8ebf5725b15e563c825be85f2f852e  honeypot.hda8.dd

MD5 Sums match those advertised on

Mount resulting disk image using loopback device:

# mkdir /t
# mount -o ro,loop,nodev,noexec honeypot.hda8.dd /t

Getting the tools

Download The Coroners Toolkit from

Extract The Coroners Toolkit
# tar zxvf tct-1.06.tar.gz

Resulting files in tct-1.06
Follow instructions in README.FIRST and INSTALL to compile TCT.

Start of analysis - Recovering the rootkit

10/05/2001 22:00

Run the TCT grave-robber with the following options (I did as suggested and read the Forensic Challenge Results, thanks Dave D for your write-up)

# pwd
# ../bin/grave-robber -c /t -m -d . -o LINUX2
# ../bin/ils honeypot.hda8.dd | ../extras/ils2mac > hda8.body
# cat body hda8.body>body-full

Have a look to see what dates files were changed in /bin (/t/bin)

# ls -lat /t/bin
lrwxrwxrwx    1 root     root            4 Mar 15 22:10 sh -> bash*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root        35300 Feb 27 02:23 netstat*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root        33280 Feb 27 02:23 ps*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root         2448 Mar  9  2000 doexec*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root        19228 Mar  9  2000 ipcalc*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root        16252 Mar  9  2000 usleep*

We can see that netstat & ps have different dates to the other files, as do the links. Now the same for /t/sbin.

# ls -lat /t/sbin
lrwxrwxrwx    1 root     root            4 Mar 15 22:10 reboot -> halt*
lrwxrwxrwx    1 root     root            4 Mar 15 22:10 telinit -> init*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root        19840 Feb 27 02:23 ifconfig*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root        22912 Mar  9  2000 chkconfig*
-rwxr-xr-x    1 root     root         2684 Mar  9  2000 consoletype*

ifconfig seems to have a different timestamp here, but the timestamp is the same as the other 2 files that have different time stamps..

The above would indicate that the following files form at least part of the rootkit, there are probably other files too, somewhere else.


These tools are most likely to hide the other rootkit tools, comprising at least a sniffer (for which ifconfig hides promiscuity, and ps & netstat hide other attributes).  I'd be surprised if there is not s

Lets use 15 March 2001 as the date to check from

# ../bin/mactime -p /t/etc/passwd -g /etc/group -b body-full 03/15/2001 > mactime.txt

Going through the resulting mactime.txt it appears as though the system was actually installed on March 15.  Lots of files are being created/modified, including a lot of init scripts and their corresponding links in rc<n>.d. (Maybe this box was the system in question on the Honeynet Home Page?). 


Based on our research, we have identified the following.
"The life expectancy of an unpatched, default installation of Red Hat 6.2 server is three days. The last time we attempted to confirm this, the system was compromised in eight hours."


System installation ends at Mar 15 2001 22:20:39 (GMT+10).

First access after install is complete is to /etc/HOSTNAME on Mar 16 2001 04:22:25 (which now contains asdf1).

The next file that is created is /lib/modules/2.2.14-5.0/modules.dep

Mar 15 01 22:20:38      160 m.c -rw-r--r-- root     root     /t/etc/lilo.conf
Mar 15 01 22:20:39      160 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     /t/etc/lilo.conf
Mar 16 01 04:22:25        6 mac -rw-r--r-- root     root     /t/etc/HOSTNAME
Mar 16 01 04:22:30     1024 m.c drwxr-xr-x root     root     /t/lib/modules/2.2.14-5.0
                      28633 m.c -rw-r--r-- root     root     /t/lib/modules/2.2.14-5.0/modules.dep
Mar 16 01 04:22:34       60 mac -rw------- root     root     /t/etc/
                      13708 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     /t/etc/rc.d/rc.sysinit
                         14 .a. lrwxrwxrwx root     root     /t/etc/rc.d/rc3.d/K05innd -> ../init.d/innd
Mar 16 01 04:22:35       13 .a. lrwxrwxrwx root     root     /t/etc/rc.d/rc3.d/K20nfs -> ../init.d/nfs
                         16 .a. lrwxrwxrwx root     root     /t/etc/rc.d/rc3.d/K20rstatd -> ../init.d/rstatd
                         17 .a. lrwxrwxrwx root     root     /t/etc/rc.d/rc3.d/K20rusersd -> ../init.d/rusersd

The file /t/etc/ seems to correspond with at the very least a change in runlevel, if not a reboot. There is a lot of activity in /t/etc/rc3.d. It looks like X is not running on this system, and the runlevel is being set to 3, which in turn causes a whole lot of other file accesses. Checking this behaviour on my system I can confirm that the file gets written at reboot.

Recovering deleted files

# grep "\-dead\-" macfiles.txt

Feb 09 02 00:08:13   611931 m.. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2039>
                      33135 mac -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-56231>
                         16 ma. lrwxrwxrwx root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-12107>
                         16 ma. lrwxrwxrwx root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-20883>
                         16 ma. lrwxrwxrwx root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-28172>
                         16 ..c lrwxrwxrwx root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-12107>
                        239 .ac -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-16110>
                         16 ..c lrwxrwxrwx root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-20883>
                         16 ..c lrwxrwxrwx root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-28172>
                      66736 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-30188>
                      42736 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-48284>
Mar 16 01 04:29:12    60080 .a. -r-xr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-30191>
Mar 16 01 12:36:48   520333 m.. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-23>
                     611931 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2039>
                          1 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2040>
                       1345 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2043>
                        880 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2048>
                        344 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2050>
                        688 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2052>
                     520333 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-23>
                       4060 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2047>
                       8268 .a. -rwx------ root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2053>
                      53588 .ac -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2058>
                         75 .a. -rwx------ root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2059>
                      66736 ..c -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-30188>
                      60080 ..c -r-xr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-30191>
                      42736 ..c -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-48284>
                       3278 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2044>
                         79 .a. -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2045>
                      11407 .a. -rw-r--r-- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2046>
                       4060 ..c -rwxr-xr-x root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2047>
                        540 .ac -rw------- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2049>
                        512 .ac -rw------- root     root     <honeypot.hda8.dd-dead-2051>

Our first deleted file to recover was deleted on Feb 09.

# ../bin/icat honeypot.hd8.dd 2039 > 2039

Turns out this inode was reused later and was deleted again on 12:44:50

# strings 2039

Usage: %s [options] host [command]
  -l user     Log in using this user name.
  -n          Redirect input from /dev/null.
  -a          Disable authentication agent forwarding.
  -x          Disable X11 connection forwarding.
  -i file     Identity for RSA authentication (default: ~/.ssh/identity).
  -t          Tty; allocate a tty even if command is given.
  -v          Verbose; display verbose debugging messages.
  -V          Display version number only.
  -q          Quiet; don't display any warning messages.
  -f          Fork into background after authentication.
  -e char     Set escape character; ``none'' = disable (default: ~).
  -c cipher   Select encryption algorithm: ``idea'', ``blowfish'', ``3des''
  -p port     Connect to this port.  Server must be on the same port.
  -P          Don't use privileged source port.
  -L listen-port:host:port   Forward local port to remote address
  -R listen-port:host:port   Forward remote port to local address
              These cause %s to listen for connections on a port, and
              forward them to the other side by connecting to host:port.
  -C          Enable compression.
  -g          Allow remote hosts to connect to local port forwardings
  -o 'option' Process the option as if it was read from a configuration file.
Using rsh.  WARNING: Connection will not be encrypted.
setuid: %.100s
You don't exist, go away!
Warning: Identity file %s does not exist.
Too many identity files specified (max %d)
SSH Version %s [%s], protocol version %d.%d.
Standard version.  Does not use RSAREF.

Looks like this is an ssh 1.2.30 client.

10/05/2001 23:45 - 2:15
12/05/2001 19:00

Processing all deleted files using above commands yields the following when determining the file types:

./files/23: gzip compressed data, deflated, last modified: Sat Mar  3 14:09:06 2001, os: Unix
./files/2038: empty
./files/2039: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), not stripped
./files/2040: ASCII text
./files/2041: Bourne shell script text executable
./files/2042: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
./files/2043: Bourne-Again shell script text executable
./files/2044: ASCII English text
./files/2045: Bourne shell script text executable
./files/2046: ASCII English text
./files/2047: perl script text executable
./files/2048: ASCII English text
./files/2049: data
./files/2050: ASCII text, with very long lines
./files/2051: data
./files/2052: ASCII text
./files/2053: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), not stripped
./files/2054: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
./files/2058: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
./files/2059: ASCII text
./files/2060: ASCII text
./files/2061: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), not stripped
./files/8097: empty
./files/8100: ASCII English text
./files/12107: empty
./files/16110: ASCII text
./files/20883: empty
./files/22103: empty
./files/22104: empty
./files/22105: empty
./files/22106: empty
./files/22107: empty
./files/22108: empty
./files/28172: empty
./files/30188: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
./files/30191: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
./files/48284: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1, dynamically linked (uses shared libs), stripped
./files/56231: ASCII text, with no line terminators

The first file looks most interesting since it is an archive and probably contains other files. Lets get a list of the contents:

# tar tvf 23

drwxr-xr-x 1031/users        0 2001-02-27 07:40:30 last/
tar: Archive contains future timestamp 2002-02-09 00:08:13
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users   611931 2002-02-09 00:08:13 last/ssh
-rw-r--r-- 1031/users        1 2001-02-27 02:29:58 last/pidfile
-rwx------ 1031/users     3713 2001-03-03 14:08:37 last/install
-rwx------ 1031/users     7165 2001-02-27 02:22:50 last/linsniffer
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users     1345 1999-09-10 01:57:11 last/cleaner
-rw-r--r-- 1031/users     3278 2001-01-28 02:11:32 last/inetd.conf
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users       79 2001-02-27 02:28:40 last/lsattr
-rw-r--r-- 1031/users    11407 2001-01-28 02:11:44 last/services
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users     4060 2001-02-27 02:22:55 last/sense
-rw-r--r-- 1031/users      880 2000-10-23 06:29:44 last/ssh_config
-rw------- 1031/users      540 2000-10-23 06:29:44 last/ssh_host_key
-rw-r--r-- 1031/users      344 2000-10-23 06:29:44 last/
-rw------- 1031/users      512 2000-10-23 06:29:44 last/ssh_random_seed
-rw-r--r-- 1031/users      688 2001-02-27 02:29:51 last/sshd_config
-rwx------ 1031/users     8268 2001-02-27 02:22:59 last/sl2
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users     4620 2001-02-27 02:23:10 last/last.cgi
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users    33280 2001-02-27 02:23:33 last/ps
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users    35300 2001-02-27 02:23:42 last/netstat
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users    19840 2001-02-27 02:23:47 last/ifconfig
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users    53588 2001-02-27 02:23:55 last/top
-rwx------ 1031/users       75 2001-02-27 02:24:03 last/logclear
-rw-r--r-- root/root       708 2001-03-03 14:05:12 last/s
-rwxr-xr-x 1031/users   632066 2001-02-27 01:46:04 last/mkxfs

This means that our rootkit has now been recovered.

Identifying the files that make up the rootkit

Based on size and type these files match some of our deleted files.  Lets take a look at the install script.

echo    "********* Instalarea Rootkitului A Pornit La Drum *********"
echo    "********* Mircea SUGI PULA ********************************"
echo    "********* Multumiri La Toti Care M-Au Ajutat **************" 
echo    "********* Lemme Give You A Tip : **************************"
echo    "********* Ignore everything, call your freedom ************"
echo    "********* Scream & swear as much as you can ***************"
echo    "********* Cuz anyway nobody will hear you and no one will *"
echo    "********* Care about you **********************************"

Can't seem to work out what language that is..  could be Malay or Indonesian, but then some searches for the words in the first three lines seem to indicate that it's Romanian.  No luck trying to translate it at any of the translation sites.

12/05/2001 20:30 - 1:30
13/05/2001 14:15

The install script then goes on to replace the various system files with the rootkit files & writes some names of processes/files etc to remain invisible to the administrator when running the backdoored tools.


3 sl2
3 sshdu
3 linsniffer
3 smurf
3 slice
3 mech
3 muh
3 bnc
3 psybnc


1 193.231.139
1 213.154.137
1 193.254.34
3 48744
3 3666
3 31221
3 22546
4 48744
4 2222
It then copies all the backdoored files to two folders (presumably in case one gets found)

"/dev/ida/.. "

13/05/2001 14:30 - 0:15
17/05/2001 10:30

The first of these two files looks like it contains strings that the backdoored ps should hide, while the second file contains strings (subnets, ports) that the backdoored netstat command should hide.  Lets see if we can find the file names in the strings of either of these programs.

# strings ps

No trace of /dev/rpm , but there is a reference to /dev/dsx and that device doesn't exist on the system! Same applies for top.

17/05/2001 11:00 - 0:30
17/05/2001 13:00

# strings netstat

No trace of /dev/last, references to /dev/caca and /dev/route, neither of which exist.

Doing a strings on the ifconfig binary reveals that the PROMISC flag has been stripped from it (as compared with the ifconfig from my system anyway).

Continuing on with the install script, /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services get overwritten with rootkit versions, and inetd gets told to re-read its configuration files.  I can't find anything obviously nasty here, except maybe just the telnet daemon being enabled.

Next /usr/bin/lsattr is replaced by a script that starts a backdoored ssh server (mkxfs) and linsniffer, and a line is added to the end of /etc/rc.d/rc.local. We cannot actually see anything that was in /usr since that was on a different filesystem.  The /dev/ida/.drag-on/s configuration file is used by the ssh server, and specifies that it should bind to port 5 (from snort port search database - Remote Job Entry) which is not often used.  Linsniffer is configured to log to /dev/ida/.drag-on/tcp.log.  There is a small amount of data in this file, but nothing of any value.  The immutable flag is set on /usr/bin/lsattr, preventing normal operations from making any changes to the file.  The immutable flag would have to be removed to do anything to the file.

The install script then goes looking for a web server cgi-scripts folder to put the last.cgi file in. last.cgi appears to allow a remote user to run arbitrary commands through the web server (perhaps to restore /dev/ida/.drag-on with files from /dev/ida/".. ").

Before cleaning up, the install script collects some system information using uname, hostname, ifconfig, uptime, cpuinfo and mails it off to and with subject lines "placinte" and "root" respectively.

17/05/2001 14:00 - 1:00
17/05/2001 21:00

The file that was at deleted inode 2050 contains an email address ( along with a long string of numbers which looks like an ssh key, matches rootkit's

The full list of files that makes up our rootkit is as follows:

lk.tgz or lk.tar.gz - Our rootkit tarball



cleaner of system log files
backdoored ifconfig without PROMISC flag to hide linsniffer
replacement inetd.conf
rootkit installation script
backdoor cgi binary for web server
traffic sniffer
script to clear linsniffer log file
script to launch backdoored sshd and linsniffer at system startup
backdoored sshd
backdoored netstat to hide network connections by IP or port number
process id file for mkxfs
backdoored ps binary to hide processes matching certain names
configuration file for mkxfs
perl script to sort through data captured by linsniffer
replacement services file
not sure, maybe some sort of port scanner, strings indicate an ip address should be specified along with a low and high port number
secure shell client, apparently not used as it does not get copied anywhere and is deleted at the end of install script
secure shell client config file
secure shell host key (private)
secure shell host key (public)
secure shell random seed file
secure shell server basic config file
backdoored top binary to hide processes matching certain names

Was the rootkit installed?

The installation script was certainly executed, since a whole bunch of the files exist where the script places them.  Whether the installation was actually successful is another question.  The files were definitely placed where the install script intended to place them, /dev/ida/.drag-on and /dev/ida/".. ", with the configuration files for ps,top and netstat in /dev.  The tarball file was deleted, as were the files extracted from it.  Also the /etc/services and /etc/inetd.conf files match those supplied with the rootkit.  The linsniffer was very briefly used prior to 17/03/2001 03:28 (GMT+10), since that is the last time of modification, though nothing shows up in mactimes after the initial creation of the file. There is no definitive way to tell if the last.cgi file ever got installed since it would have lived on a different file-system that is not available to us, nor can we see if the log files were cleaned using the cleaner script (written by someone of German origins).

Three of the four backdoored binaries that were installed in /bin and /sbin had (as far as I was able to determine) different configuration file requirements than those created by the install script.  The install script created /dev/rpm for ps and top, and /dev/last for netstat.  Since the binaries had references to /dev/dsx and /dev/caca respectively I would think that the configuration files won't actually be found, and thus the rootkit would not be doing its job properly, and thus would be easier to spot.

17/05/2001 23:30 - 2:30
Name Time Spent Yrs Sysadmin/Security
John Berkers 8:00 6/0.5